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ameliorate the popular-electoral vote conformance problem 
enough to justify the other problems they would cause.
Given these realities, a direct popular vote is the only effective 
method for remedying the Electoral College’s defects. The 
rationale behind the advantage that the Electoral College 
confers on small states is tenuous. The current system does 
little to functionally privilege those states’ interests even 
when they are competitive. More importantly, the system is 
remarkably effective at disenfranchising broad swaths of the 
American electorate, especially voters who live outside of 
battleground states and those who are members of in-state 
political minorities. Implementing a direct national vote ensures 
that every vote is equal and incentivizes candidates to compete 
for votes in big and small communities across the country. 
Furthermore, it affirms the fundamental notion that the popular 
vote decides who wins and uses an election system familiar to 
every American. 
The NPVIC is the most workable means to reform the Electoral 
College outside of the amending the Constitution, which is 
made impractical by the requirements for approval in two-
thirds of both houses of Congress and in three-fourths of state 
legislatures. State-by-state allocation changes are unrealistic 
because any single state loses power in the Electoral College by 
switching away from winner-takes-all to either the district or 
proportional systems. There are also still considerable questions 
about whether the NPVIC is constitutional, with or without 
congressional approval. This report does not seek to answer 
those questions; even if it faces credible court challenges, it 
is still a powerful political mechanism to spur other reform 
measures.
Finally, we advocate for instant runoff, or ranked choice, voting 
because a first-past-the-post direct national election introduces 
too great a possibility of a candidate winning the presidency 
with less than a majority of the popular vote. One benefit of the 
Electoral College system is that it forces the winner to obtain a 
majority (of electors or state House delegations), manifesting 
the importance of a true governing mandate. Accordingly, 
we believe a direct national election should go to an instant 
runoff via a ranked-choice voting procedure if no candidate has 
obtained a majority of the popular vote. 
Executive Summary
This report examines ways states can change elector allocation 
in the Electoral College to better reflect the popular vote. It 
considers four options: (1) direct election; (2) proportional 
allocation based on the results of the statewide popular vote 
in each state; (3) the congressional district method, which 
involves allocation based on the results of the popular vote in 
congressional districts; and (4) ranked choice/instant runoff 
voting. We recommend direct election implemented via the 
National Popular Vote Interstate Compact, an agreement 
among states to assign their electoral votes to the winner of the 
national popular vote. The NPVIC takes effect when compacting 
states have enough electoral votes—270—to choose the 
president. Fifteen states and the District of Columbia, which 
together hold 196 electoral votes, have joined the compact.
We also recommend instant runoff voting to ensure the winning 
candidate obtains a majority of votes. This system requires 
voters to rank their preferences when there are more than two 
candidates. If no candidate receives a majority of first choice 
votes, the votes of the candidate with the fewest first choice 
votes are reassigned in a process that repeats until a candidate 
wins a majority.
We endorse the NPVIC for several reasons. Proportional 
allocation and the congressional district method are both less 
effective at improving the electoral vote’s conformance with the 
popular vote. They also present many of their own problems. 
Proportional allocation of votes according to states’ respective 
popular votes requires states to design rules designating 
thresholds for obtaining electors—a process that would be 
subject to partisan gaming and could threaten the integrity of 
the interstate and largely uniform system. Allocating a state’s 
electoral votes based on the vote in its congressional districts 
creates similar incentives for legislatures to manipulate the 
system for partisan advantage, especially by gerrymandering 
congressional districts. Both systems are susceptible to 
additional problems when there are third party candidates. Such 
contests involve increased risk that no candidate will receive a 
majority of the electoral votes, which would trigger the highly 
problematic contingent election process. In that process, the 
House of Representatives is tasked with choosing the president 
from the top three candidates. In sum, neither proportional 
allocation nor the congressional district method would 
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Introduction: An Executive Accountable to the People
The use of the popular vote at the state and district level has 
not always resulted in the winner of the national popular vote 
capturing the presidency. In two of the last five presidential 
elections, closely-contested races were awarded to the loser 
of the national popular vote due to narrow statewide popular 
victories leading to an electoral majority.7 The candidate who 
won the most popular votes across the nation has lost in a total 
of five elections.8
The key question today is whether the system can remain 
legitimate in the eyes of the American people. Moreover, voters 
in solidly blue and red states who prefer candidates from a 
different party now are “effectively disenfranchised.”9
These problems are a fundamental threat to the system’s 
efficacy that demand immediate reform. In its first Part, this 
report addresses the Electoral College system’s evolution from 
a deliberative check on the public to a mere mathematical quirk 
in voting. The second Part addresses the system’s advantages 
and disadvantages by examining the five times it failed to 
select the winner of the national popular vote. The third Part 
examines four proposals for reform. The final Part advocates for 
coordinated state action to allow voters to select the president 
through a national popular vote.
7 Katherine Florey, Losing Bargain: Why Winner-Take-All Vote Assignment is 
the Electoral College’s Least Defensible Feature, 68 CASE W. RES. 317, 346-47 
(2017).
8 Jose A. Del Real & Julie Turkewitz, Should the Electoral College Be Eliminated? 
15 States Are Trying to Make it Obsolete, N.Y. TIMES (May 22, 2019), https://
www.nytimes.com/2019/05/22/us/electoral-college.html.
9 See KOZA, supra note 6, at 11.
The Electoral College is a unique system of voting: no other 
democracy chooses its executive in the same manner, nor does 
any U.S. state use such a system to elect its governor.1 This 
complicated system reflects an attempt by the Constitution’s 
framers to balance competing desires for an executive who 
would be independent of Congress and insulated from the 
pressure of a potentially ill-informed public.2 But the Electoral 
College system as it currently functions is not what the framers 
envisioned. Beginning with the nation’s earliest elections, the 
system evolved in response to demands for more representative 
government.3 In modern elections, the statewide popular vote 
is used in all but two states to determine how electors will 
cast their votes for president.4 In 48 states and the District of 
Columbia, all electors are awarded to the plurality winner of the 
vote in a system more commonly known as winner-takes-all.5 
Two states allocate electors according to the outcome the vote 
in their congressional districts.6
1 Keith E. Whittington, Originalism, Constitutional Construction, and the Problem 
of Faithless Electors, 59 ARIZ. L. REV. 903, 906 (2017).
2 Brandon H. Robb, Making the Electoral College Work Today: The Agreement 
Among the States to Elect the President by National Popular Vote, 54 LOY. L. 
REV. 419, 426-27 (2008).
3 Matthew J. Festa, The Origins and Constitutionality of State Unit Voting in the 
Electoral College, 54 VAND. L. REV. 2099, 2124-25 (2001).
4 Id. at 2126.
5 U.S. Electoral College: Frequently Asked Questions, NAT’L ARCHIVES & RECORDS 
ADMIN., https://www.archives.gov/federal-register/electoral-college/faq.
html (last visited Dec. 17, 2018). 
6 JOHN R. KOZA ET AL., EVERY VOTE EQUAL: A STATE-BASED PLAN FOR ELECTING THE 
PRESIDENT BY NATIONAL POPULAR VOTE xxxvi (4th ed. 2013).
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This Part discusses the Electoral College’s development at the 
Constitutional Convention in 1787. It then discusses how the 
Electoral College quickly evolved to become more democratic. 
The final section of this Part provides an overview of some of 
the major attempts to reform the Electoral College. 
A.  The Convention Plan for a  
Deliberative Body
The Electoral College was a compromise created after 
competing coalitions at the Constitutional Convention could 
not agree on whether to select the executive through direct 
national election, legislative appointment, or some combination 
of the two. Many of the framers believed appointment by the 
legislature would make the president beholden to lawmakers.10 
The other main option—direct popular election—would be 
more democratic, but some delegates had concerns that an 
ill-informed public could be swayed to install a demagogue.11 
This conflict of values was highly factional, with small states 
and southern states banding together against direct election.12 
Small states feared direct election would diminish their voting 
power, while the southern states wanted the same power 
they secured in legislative apportionment via the Three-Fifths 
Clause to count in executive selection.13 The clause provided 
that three-fifths of the slaves in southern states would be 
counted toward the states’ population size in determining 
how many representatives they would have in the House of 
Representatives.14 The number of electors each state would 
receive in the Electoral College would be determined by the 
respective sizes of states’ combined representation in the 
House and Senate.15
The delegates passed the issue to a subcommittee after 
several contradicting votes.16 Seeking to resolve the impasse, 
it recommended a body convened every four years through 
separate proceedings in each state to select the president called 
10 John D. Feerick, The Electoral College—Why It Ought To Be Abolished, 37 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 6 (1968).  
11 ROBERT M. HARDAWAY, THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE AND THE CONSTITUTION: THE CASE FOR 
PRESERVING FEDERALISM 48 (1994).
12 See Shlomo Slonim, The Electoral College at Philadelphia: The Evolution of an 
Ad Hoc Congress for the Selection of a President, 73 J. AM. HIST. 35, 41 (1986) 
(discussing small state interests in avoiding a national popular election).
13 See id. See also GEORGE C. EDWARDS, WHY THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE IS BAD FOR 
AMERICA 87 (2004) (discussing southern states’ desires to retain Three-
Fifths Compromise in executive selection).
14 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3. 
15 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2.
16 See EDWARDS, supra note 13, at 79-80 (stating that the issue was referred to 
the Committee of Eleven).
the Electoral College.17 States would select the members of 
this group to deliberate on candidates for the presidency and 
choose the one who would best serve the nation.18 The proposal 
conceded to the smaller and southern states outsized voting 
power, while still making the national executive accountable 
to the whole nation. Delegates left satisfied they had created a 
legitimate and fair process that would choose highly competent 
leaders who were invested in the Republic.19
B.  Partisanship and Popular Demand  
Hijack The System
The states were empowered to determine how their respective 
electors would be chosen.20 Courts have held that this power is 
unqualified;21 the only constitutional restriction is that an elector 
may not be a “Senator or Representative, or Person holding an 
Office of Trust or Profit under the United States.”22 For some 
time, the flexibility provided to states resulted in a patchwork of 
processes across the country.23 The Electoral College’s evolution 
into the consistent system we know today reflects the demands 
of popular and partisan politics, manifested in several critical 
shifts in the nation’s early history.
The first such shift occurred in 1796.24 In the first two 
presidential elections, in 1788 and 1792, electors had carefully 
deliberated as the framers envisioned, but this did not 
occur during the nation’s first competitive election between 
Federalists and Democratic-Republicans.25 Both parties in the 
1796 election left nothing to chance, and only chose electors in 
the states they controlled who would commit to voting for their 
party’s candidate.26 The winner, Federalist John Adams, secured 
a majority by a three-vote margin with all but one elector voting 
for their party’s candidate.27 This election marked the beginning 
of electors serving a ministerial function of casting votes as 
instructed, instead of engaging in deliberation.28
17 See Festa, supra note 3, at 2116.
18 See EDWARDS, supra note 13, at 79-80.
19 See Slonim, supra note 12, at 36.
20 Jerry H. Goldfeder, Election Law and the Presidency: An Introduction and 
Overview, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 965, 967 (2016).
21 See McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1 (1892); see also Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 
98 (2000). 
22 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2; see Goldfeder, supra note 20, at 969.
23 See KOZA, supra note 6, at 74.
24 See id. at 75.
25 See id.
26 See id.
27 See id. at 76.
28 See id. at 78 (“Since 1796, the Electoral College has had the form, but not 
the substance, of the deliberative body envisioned by the Founders.”).
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The Electoral College’s evolution continued with the 12th 
Amendment, which was prompted by the election of 1800.29 
In that contest, Democratic-Republican candidate Thomas 
Jefferson received 73 electoral votes to incumbent John Adams’ 
65.30 Yet Jefferson did not win the presidency outright.31 His 
party had failed to correctly account for the Electoral College’s 
rules when it instructed electors on how to vote.32 Under the 
Electoral College’s original rules, the candidate who received 
a majority of electoral votes would be president and the 
candidate who received the second most votes would be vice 
president.33 Due to the Democratic-Republicans’ oversight, 
Jefferson’s running mate, Aaron Burr, received the same 
number of electoral votes as Jefferson.34 A tie between two 
candidates required the House of Representatives to choose the 
president.35 After 35 ballots, Jefferson ultimately prevailed.36
Seeking to avoid a repeat of the 1800 election, Congress 
approved the 12th Amendment to require that electors 
cast separate ballots for president and vice president.37 The 
amendment was ratified in September 1804, in time for that 
year’s presidential election.38
The next shift in the Electoral College’s functioning was the 
move away from selection of electors by state legislatures. Over 
the nation’s first decades, states used several different methods 
for choosing electors. The most common methods were 
appointment by legislatures, statewide and district popular 
voting, or some combination of those methods.39 A trend 
toward statewide popular vote steadily emerged, and by 1832 
all but one state chose electors by popular vote.40
State legislatures also realized they could maximize electoral 
votes for their preferred candidate by using a “unit rule,” or 
winner-takes-all system.41 States had strong incentives to 
switch to this rule: maximizing the winner’s votes put more 
pressure on candidates to compete there, and other states 
switching to winner-takes-all only reduced a state’s relative 
29 See Goldfeder, supra note 20, at 976.
30 See id. at 975.
31 Id.
32 See id.
33 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1, cl. 3.
34 See Goldfeder, supra note 20, at 975.
35 See id.
36 See id. at 976.
37 See U.S. CONST. amend. XII; Goldfeder, supra note 20, at 976.
38 See Goldfeder, supra note 20, at 976.
39 See Festa, supra note 3, at 2124.
40 Id. at 2125.
41 See id. at 2124-25.
power if it did not switch too.42 In the 1832 election, all of 
the states that appointed electors through the popular vote 
used the winner-takes-all system.43 This dynamic still looms 
for states considering a switch away from winner-takes-all 
systems.
C. Reform Attempts Fail to End  
Winner-Takes-All
Three periods in American history provide especially strong 
examples of the flaws in the Electoral College system. The 
elections that took place in two of these periods ignited debate 
about reforming or abolishing the Electoral College.
The first period immediately followed the 1876 presidential 
election, the second election in which the popular vote winner 
did not obtain an electoral vote majority.44 Democrats made 
allegations of fraud in key southern states where the Republican 
candidate, Rutherford B. Hayes, purportedly won narrow popular 
victories.45 With no clear winner of the majority of electoral 
votes, the House of Representatives could have chosen the 
president.46 Instead, both parties in Congress decided to create 
a commission to resolve the conflict over the disputed electoral 
votes. Hayes ultimately prevailed following a key party-line vote 
by the commission.47 The moment highlighted how partisan 
conflict and obscure procedures could lead either candidate 
to victory in a close race. Twelve years later, a Democrat again 
lost the Electoral College after winning the popular vote.48 The 
dysfunction of the 1876 election gave proponents of Electoral 
College reform a compelling example of some of the flaws in the 
system that they have continued to cite.49
The second moment occurred in the late 1960s and 1970s. 
The 1968 election was a key event in this period that added 
significant momentum to the push for reform. In that 
race, Alabama Governor George Wallace ran a third-party 
candidacy focused on winning enough electoral votes to 
deny one of the major party candidates—Richard Nixon and 
Hubert Humphrey—enough votes to win an Electoral College 
42 See Michael J. O’Sullivan, Artificial Unit Voting and the Electoral College, 65 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 2421, 2427 (1992).
43 See Festa, supra note 3, at 2125.
44 See Robb, supra note 2, at 441-42.
45 See id.
46 See U.S. CONST. amend. XII.
47 See id.
48 See id. at 442-43.
49 See, e.g., KOZA, supra note 6, at 126-27; ABA COMM’N ON ELECTORAL COLLEGE 
REFORM, ELECTING THE PRESIDENT 31-32 (1967).
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majority.50 Wallace wanted to bargain his electoral votes in 
exchange for policy concessions from Nixon or Humphrey.51 
He ultimately won 45 electoral votes by winning five southern 
states, but Nixon did not need those votes to capture the 
presidency.52 Still, the election was close53 and Wallace’s 
strategy highlighted vulnerabilities in the system that many 
believed justified broad reform.
Senator Birch Bayh of Indiana championed the most prominent 
reform plan—a constitutional amendment providing for direct 
popular election.54 Under his proposal, a plurality winner 
receiving 40 percent or more of the national popular vote would 
become president. If no candidate reached that threshold, the 
top two vote-getting candidates would proceed to a runoff.55 
The American Bar Association promoted a direct election 
amendment with the same runoff threshold during this period.56
The Bayh proposal won a required two-thirds vote in the House 
in 1969, but progress stalled when it reached the Senate.57 
As the chamber considered the amendment, a coalition of 
southern senators concerned with states’ rights and small-
state conservatives emerged to filibuster the amendment.58 
Yet reform regained some momentum after the 1976 election, 
which saw Jimmy Carter narrowly avoid defeat in the Electoral 
College despite exceeding Gerald Ford in the popular vote 
count by more than 1.5 million.59 A “shift of 3,687 popular votes 
in Hawaii and 5,559 popular votes in Ohio” would have cost 
Carter the presidency.60 Bayh’s proposal received a final vote in 
the Senate in 1979, when it garnered majority support but not 
the required two-thirds.61 Although unsuccessful, the reform 
effort of the 1960s and 1970s was the closest the nation has 
come in modern times to implementing popular election.62




54 See John R. Bohrer, Birch Bayh’s Long War On The Electoral College, BUZZFEED 
(Nov. 6, 2012, 1:39 PM), https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/
johnrbohrer/birch-bayhs-long-war-on-the-electoral-college.
55 Florey, supra note 7, at 381.
56 See ABA COMM’N ON ELECTORAL COLLEGE REFORM, supra note 49.
57 See Florey, supra note 7, at 381.
58 See id. at 382.
59 KOZA, supra note 6, at 128.
60 Id.
61 See id.
62 See Florey, supra note 7, at 318.
Renewed enthusiasm for Electoral College reform followed the 
two recent popular-electoral splits in 2000 and 2016.63 The 
close national popular vote margins between the two major 
party candidates in recent presidential elections increases the 
likelihood of popular-electoral vote splits.64 The margins have 
also been close in many key states, and several large states 
have increasingly awarded their electoral votes to candidates 
winning the statewide vote by less than two percent. In 2016, 
the margin was less than two percent in five states with more 
than ten electoral votes.65
The 2000 election inspired a new approach to reform that 
received fresh interest following the 2016 election. Instead 
of attempting the politically difficult option of amending the 
Constitution, many reformers have turned their attention to 
changes to the way states allocate electors. The National 
Popular Vote Interstate Compact (“NPVIC”) has been the most 
novel and successful of these efforts. 
The NPVIC is an agreement among states to award their 
electors to the winner of the national popular vote, but only 
once the enacting states hold a majority of the electoral votes.66 
The plan was initially advocated in 2001 by Robert Bennett,67 
and later elaborated on by Akhil and Vikram Amar.68 An 
organization called National Popular Vote Inc. was founded in 
2006 to draft template NPVIC legislation and advocate for its 
passage in legislatures across the country.69
Though appealing in its simplicity, the compact stalled out 
after some success in heavily Democratic states through the 
late 2000s and early 2010s.70 However, the 2016 election 
helped lead to the NPVIC’s adoption in Connecticut in 2018 and 
63 Jillian Robbins, Changing the System Without Changing the System: How the 
National Popular Vote Interstate Compact Would Leave Non-Compacting States 
Without A Leg to Stand On, 2017 CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO 1, 9 (2017).
64 See Florey, supra note 7, at 344.
65 Presidential Election Results: Donald J. Trump Wins, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 9, 2017, 
9:00 AM), https://www.nytimes.com/elections/2016/results/president.
66 Dennis A. Lienhardt, Jr., The Electoral College: An Analysis of Reform Proposals 
Through the Lens of Past Presidential Elections, 61 WAYNE L. REV. 439, 447 
(2016).
67 See Robert Bennett, Popular Election of the President Without A Constitutional 
Amendment, 4 GREEN BAG 241 (2001).
68 See Akhil Reed Amar & Vikram David Amar, How to Achieve Direct National 
Election of the President Without Amending the Constitution: Part Three of a 
Three-Part Series on the 2000 Election and the Electoral College., FINDLAW: U.S. 
SUPREME COURT CTR. (Dec. 28, 2001), https://supreme.findlaw.com/legal-
commentary/how-to-achieve-direct-national-election-of-the-president-
without-amending-the-constitution.html.
69 Tim Alberta, Is the Electoral College Doomed?, POLITICO MAG. (Sept./Oct. 
2007), https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/09/05/electoral-
college-national-popular-vote-compact-215541.
70 See KOZA, supra note 6, at 282-91.
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Colorado, Delaware, New Mexico, and Oregon in 2019.71 The 
compact covers states and the District of Columbia comprising 
196 electoral votes so far.72 Significantly, states have only 
enacted the NPVIC when Democrats have had unified control 
of their government.73 It may also face constitutional challenges, 
and courts would likely need to resolve lawsuits challenging the 
compact before it would ever go into effect.74
D.  The Electoral College Today:  
A Brief Review
There are currently 538 electoral votes in the Electoral 
College.75 Each state has electors equal to its total number 
of representatives in Congress, and the District of Columbia 
has three electors pursuant to the 23rd Amendment.76 A 
presidential candidate must receive a majority of 270 electoral 
votes to win. If no candidate receives a majority of electoral 
votes, the House of Representatives elects the president in a 
71 National Popular Vote, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.
org/research/elections-and-campaigns/national-popular-vote.aspx (last 
visited June 26, 2019).
72 Caroline Kelly, Oregon governor signs bill granting state’s electoral votes 
to national popular vote winner, CNN (June 12, 2019, 6:06 PM), https://
www.cnn.com/2019/06/12/politics/oregon-joins-national-popular-vote-
compact/index.html.
73 Status of National Popular Vote Bill in Each State, NAT’L POPULAR VOTE, https://
www.nationalpopularvote.com/state-status (last visited June 17, 2019).
74 See, e.g., David Gringer, Why the National Popular Vote Plan is the Wrong way 
to Abolish the Electoral College, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 182 (2008); Robb, supra 
note 2, at 419; see generally Mark Tushnet, Constitutional Workarounds, 87 
TEX. L. REV. 1499 (2009).
75 See Goldfeder, supra note 20, at 965.
76 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1; US CONST. amend. XXIII, § 1.
contingent election where each state delegation has one vote 
and a candidate must receive a majority to become president.77 
There are currently two schemes in the US for choosing 
electors: 48 states and the District of Columbia use the 
winner-takes-all-method, while Maine and Nebraska use the 
congressional district method.78 Most states empower political 
parties to choose a slate of electors, and allow voters to select 
a slate that will vote for the party’s candidate.79 In winner-
takes-all states (as well as DC), the slate that receives at least 
a plurality of the votes cast is elected.80 In Maine and Nebraska, 
the popular vote winner state-wide is awarded two electors, 
and the winning candidate in each congressional district is 
awarded one.81 Even in this system, votes for candidates who 
do not obtain a plurality on a state or district level are not 
represented in the electoral vote count.82 
77 See U.S. CONST. amend. XII (“The person having the greatest number of 
votes for President, shall be the President, if such number be a majority 
of the whole number of Electors appointed; and if no person have 
such majority, then from the persons having the highest numbers not 
exceeding three on the list of those voted for as President, the House 
of Representatives shall choose immediately, by ballot, the President. 
But in choosing the President, the votes shall be taken by states, the 
representation from each state having one vote; a quorum for this purpose 
shall consist of a member or members from two-thirds of the states, and 
a majority of all states shall be necessary to a choice.”); see also Nicholas 
G. Karambelas, The Electoral College and the Race to 270, 72 J. MO. B. 260 
(2016).
78 See Goldfeder, supra note 20, at 989; see Karambelas, supra note 77, at 261.
79 See Goldfeder, supra note 20, at 969.
80 See id. at 966; see also Karambelas, supra note 77, at 261.
81 See id.
82 Alexander S. Belenky, District Vote Proposals Fall Short, BALT. SUN (Dec. 
11, 2017), https://www.baltimoresun.com/news/bs-xpm-2007-12-11-
0712110033-story.html. 
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This Part addresses arguments for retaining the Electoral 
College, specifically those made on practical, historical and 
political grounds. It concludes by arguing that benefits the 
Electoral College may have provided in the past are no longer 
present and that it is not justifiable to continue using the system 
to select the president.
A. The Practical Argument
Proponents note that the Electoral College makes election 
administration easier. They argue that limiting a campaign’s 
geographic scope to battlegrounds helps candidates keep costs 
down and makes lower-budget candidacies possible.83 They 
also argue that the Electoral College lessens voter fraud and 
tabulation error because every vote’s impact is limited to the 
state where it is cast.84 Finally, proponents believe the system 
decreases the chance that a third-party candidate will earn 
electoral votes, which helps winning candidates secure a higher 
vote percentage.85 Presidents elected with a smaller plurality 
“would only aggravate the sense that the executive branch 
governs without a real electoral mandate.”86
Some of these points are thinly reasoned. For instance, vote 
manipulation’s “limited impact” in the Electoral College is 
still large enough that many state legislatures passed voter 
suppression measures through the 2010s.87 These measures 
were arguably effective at flipping several states in the 2016 
election and, ultimately, the result itself, even though their 
impacts were technically limited to only in-state vote totals.88 
The Electoral College only discourages manipulation in states 
where one party has a strong advantage. It incentivizes 
manipulation in competitive states.
However, even those more salient points troublingly presuppose 
that concerns regarding popular will should give way to “making 
elections easier.” The answer to the difficulties of democracy 
should not be to rein in democracy; rather, it should be make 
those difficulties easier to manage. Moreover, the argument 
that the Electoral College is an “easy to administer” system is 
tenuous: it is mathematically more complex than a direct vote 
and creates deeply perverse incentives for our institutions.
83 See Jack Rakove & Michael W. McConnell, Should We Abolish the Electoral 
College?, STANFORD MAG. (Sept. 1, 2016), https://stanfordmag.org/contents/
should-we-abolish-the-electoral-college.
84 Allen C. Guelzo, In Defense of the Electoral College, NAT’L AFFAIRS, Winter 
2018, at 75-76.
85 See id. at 76.
86 See id.
87 See, e.g., Ari Berman, Rigged: How Voter Suppression Threw Wisconsin to 
Trump, MOTHER JONES (Nov./Dec. 2017), https://www.motherjones.com/
politics/2017/10/voter-suppression-wisconsin-election-2016. 
88 See id. 
B. The Historical Argument
The Electoral College is the only method in the Constitution 
for electing the president; the founding document says nothing 
about the popular vote.89 As illustrated in Part I, the framers 
final compromise was meant to embody two key values of the 
competing factions: extra voting power for small and southern 
states and careful deliberation by a representative body.90 
Notions of federalism were also at play—state legislatures’ 
ultimate control of elector allocation made the states the key 
players in selecting an executive.91 Proponents argue that these 
values should weigh heavily in any proposed reform.92
However, the framers’ design for executive selection may 
not have much merit when examined in the modern era. The 
compromise with small and southern states on voting power 
was less a reasoned bargain than it was an acquiescence to 
keep the Convention together and avoid additional conflict.93 
This suggests the Electoral College, while necessary at the 
time, may not have been the preferred system of a majority 
of delegates nor upheld values they felt were particularly 
important.94 Furthermore, this agreement effectively extended 
the Three-Fifths Compromise to executive selection.95 Needless 
to say, concessions meant to preserve slavery and its vestiges 
must be viewed as extremely suspect.96
Moreover, the Electoral College’s successful history of 
facilitating transfers of power glosses over underlying issues. 
While most elections have ended with an electoral majority, 
those that have not were resolved by contingent elections.97 
89 See Guelzo, supra note 84, at 66-67 (“While it is true that, since the 19th 
century, each state has decided to appoint it electors by a popular vote, 
this is a compliment to our democratic predilections and is not required 
by the Constitution. And it should be noted that popular votes for electors 
occur only within each state; the electors then go on to do the presidential 
balloting.”).
90 See supra Part I.
91 See generally Derek T. Muller, Invisible Federalism and the Electoral College, 44 
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1237, 1251-54 (2012).
92 See, e.g., Tara Ross, The Electoral College: Enlightened Democracy, HERITAGE 
FOUND. (Nov. 1, 2004), https://www.heritage.org/the-constitution/report/
the-electoral-college-enlightened-democracy.
93 See EDWARDS, supra note 13, at 87.
94 See id. (“As early as June 2, James Wilson had suggested, as a possible 
compromise, an intermediate election plan involving an electoral college, 
and during the summer this alternative developed as ‘the second choice of 
many delegates though it was the first choice of few.’”).
95 See supra Part I.
96 See Akhil Reed Amar, The Electoral College, Unfair from Day One, N.Y. TIMES 
(Nov. 9, 2000), https://www.nytimes.com/2000/11/09/opinion/the-
electoral-college-unfair-from-day-one.html.
97 See Karambelas, supra note 77, at 262.
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Two presidential elections have been decided this way, in 1800 
and 1824.98 Today, a contingent election would fundamentally 
threaten the broader system’s efficacy and legitimacy, 
creating the potential for undue delay, and perceived or actual 
corruption, and a selection unrelated to the will of voters.99 
Such potential suggests a manifest need for reform and a 
broader notion that the system the framers designed is not as 
sacrosanct as some may deem it.
C. The Political Argument
Proponents of the Electoral College also believe that its 
unequal voting power is good for the representativeness of 
the system.100 They claim it forces candidates to appeal to the 
interests of rural voters in competitive states instead of only 
focusing on densely populated parts of the country.101 Moreover, 
proponents believe the battleground state focus incentivizes 
greater candidate moderation and outreach to a constituency 
broader than a candidate’s most ardent supporters.102 A 
candidate cannot win the presidency by simply running up 
huge margins in a certain area of the country—victory requires 
substantial support in multiple distinct locations.103 Finally, 
proponents argue presidents with popular mandates can be 
dangerous.104 Majoritarian politics can produce demagoguery, 
and the Electoral College checks the president from asserting 
a popular mandate to trammel the government’s other 
branches.105 
There are some fundamental problems with this framing. 
For one, the battleground states candidates focus on are 
not necessarily states with large moderate populations.106 
Even in competitive states, candidates’ best strategies may 
involve appealing to partisan voters, instead of moderates, to 
98 See Goldfeder, supra note 20, at 975-77.
99 Rami Fakhouri, The Most Dangerous Blot In Our Constitution: Retiring the 
Flawed Electoral College ‘Contingent Procedure’, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 705, 715 
(2010). In the election of 1824, Jackson won the popular vote and received 
the most electoral votes, but lost the contingency election. See Goldfeder, 
supra note 20, at 977.  
100 See KOZA, supra note 6, at 45-46.
101 See Guelzo, supra note 84, at 75-76.
102 Geoffrey Calderaro, Promoting Democracy While Preserving Federalism: The 
Electoral College, the National Popular Vote, and the Federal District Popular 
Vote Allocation Alternative, 82 MISS. L.J. SUPRA 287, 305 (2013).
103 Richard A. Posner, In Defense of the Electoral College, SLATE (Nov. 12, 2012, 
11:57 AM), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2012/11/defending-the-
electoral-college.html; see also Craig J. Herbst, Redrawing the Electoral Map: 
Reforming the Electoral College with the District-Popular Plan, 41 HOFSTRA L. REV. 
217, 227-28 (2012).
104 Robin Charlow, Judicial Review, Equal Protection and the Problem with 
Plebiscites, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 527, 533 (1994).
105 See generally Guelzo, supra note 84, at 77.
106 See Florey, supra note 7, at 371-73.
ensure they turn out to vote.107 Additionally, though traditional 
television and radio advertising has greater effect in denser 
locales, modern campaign strategy has trended toward voter 
targeting that weighs demographic and psychographic variables 
more heavily than geography.108 Without the Electoral College, 
campaigns would still focus on targeting individual voters. It 
is far from clear that campaigns would only focus on densely 
populated areas. Still, there is more merit to these arguments 
than the others put forth by Electoral College advocates. They 
are answerable by the following two contentions.
D. The Case for Reform 
First, there is reason to believe the Electoral College no longer 
has the moderating impact on politics it once did. American 
presidential elections have become increasingly partisan, with 
candidates focusing on turning out partisan voters, even in 
competitive states.109 There is significant evidence that because 
battleground states control elections, voters in a majority of 
the states are “effectively disenfranchised,”110 depressing voter 
turnout in non-battleground states.111 Such a dynamic demands 
asking which voters are being left out of the process, and 
whether the Electoral College actually contributes to the hyper-
partisan dynamic by deterring voters who would help mediate 
it.
Additionally, there is not a clear imperative for treating some 
voters differently than others. There may be some systemic 
benefit to elevating rural and small-state voters through the 
Electoral College, but that benefit does not clearly offset the 
cost of distorting the result of a popular election.112 The Electoral 
College effectively uses electors to multiply certain states’ vote 
totals by a coefficient. One might ask those who support this 
feature whether voters would ever approve, or politicians could 
ever defend, a popular vote system that multiplied some voters’ 
votes at the expense of others.
107 See id.
108 Frederik J. Zuiderveen Borgesius et al., Online Political Microtargeting: 
Promises and Threats for Democracy, 14 UTRECHT L.R. 82, 85 (2018).
109 See generally Alan I. Abramowitz & Steven Webster, The Rise of Negative 
Partisanship and the Nationalization of U.S. Elections in the 21st Century, 41 
ELECTORAL STUDIES 12 (2016).
110 See KOZA, supra note 6, at 11.
111 See id. at 37.
112 Even when a presidential candidate wins both the popular vote and the 
Electoral College, the margin of victory in the Electoral College is usually 
greater than the margin of victory in the popular vote. Drew Desilver, 
Trump’s Victory Another Example of How Electoral College Wins Are Bigger 
Than Popular Vote Ones, PEW RES. CTR. (Dec. 20, 2016), https://www.
pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/12/20/why-electoral-college-landslides-
are-easier-to-win-than-popular-vote-ones/. 
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We no longer live in the era of the framers—over 200 years 
of history and constitutional development separate us from 
the 1787 Convention. Over the nation’s history, a notion of an 
inalienable and equal right to vote developed as one of the 
most fundamental elements of American democracy.113 As this 
notion has taken root, several vestiges of indirect democracy 
have fallen to the wayside through progressive-minded reform, 
like the indirect election of senators.114 It is not revolutionary 
to claim that the Electoral College should do the same—it is 
merely the natural endpoint of such a political and cultural shift.
However, we recognize that reform will be difficult. A 
constitutional amendment to abolish the Electoral College 
proved unachievable during the most sustained reform effort 
to date in the mid-20th century and would be only more 
challenging today.115 Accordingly, this Part examines a set of 
proposals discussed in existing literature for reforming the 
Electoral College through the state legislatures. We considered 
the specifics of what such a reform would look like and the 
impact it would have on the system.
A. Direct National Election
The reform squarely addressed to the Electoral College’s 
deficiencies is abandoning it in favor of a direct national popular 
vote. Recent polls indicate a majority of Americans support it, 
and several presidential candidates for the 2020 election have 
endorsed it.116 In the vast majority of democracies where the 
head of state and head of government is a combined office, the 
position is filled by direct election by the national populace.117 
That it is not the case in the United States even after intense 
advocacy is a testament to the procedural and sociological 
barriers to moving to direct election. 
1. Methodology
The methodology of direct popular election is quite simple 
from a descriptive standpoint—all votes nationwide for the 
113 See Rethinking the Electoral College Debate: The Framers, Federalism, and One 
Person, One Vote, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2526, 2530 (2001).
114 Vikram David Amar, Response: The Case for Reforming Presidential Elections 
by Subconstitutional Means: The Electoral College, the National Popular Vote 
Compact, and Congressional Power, 100 GEO. L.J. 237, 237-38 (2011).
115 See supra Part I.C; Lienhardt, supra note 66, at 459.
116 Miles Parks, Abolishing the Electoral College Would be More Complicated 
Than it May Seem, NPR (Mar. 22, 2019, 3:32 PM), https://www.npr.
org/2019/03/22/705627996/abolishing-the-electoral-college-would-be-
more-complicated-than-it-may-seem.
117 Drew Desilver, Among Democracies, U.S. Stands Out in How it Chooses its 
Head of State, PEW RES. CTR. (Nov. 22, 2016), https://www.pewresearch.
org/fact-tank/2016/11/22/among-democracies-u-s-stands-out-in-how-it-
chooses-its-head-of-state/.
presidency are totaled, and the candidate with the most 
votes wins the presidency. There are practical challenges 
of implementing direct election because it would require 
either a constitutional amendment or implementation of the 
NPVIC. Both avenues are challenging, but the constitutional 
amendment route is the hardest to achieve. Additionally, 
there are several issues related to calculating the vote total 
and setting a threshold for victory in races with more than two 
candidates.
First, states would have to standardize elections so votes could 
be totaled on a national basis.118 They would either need to 
adopt similar voting procedures or have systems adaptable 
to the needs of a national vote count.119 Maine, for instance, 
recently adopted ranked choice voting for its elections.120 
Accordingly, there would need to be clarity on whether first-
choice Maine votes are counted, or whether Maine only sends 
votes for president after a candidate has secured a statewide 
majority. State requirements for ballot placement, write-
in candidacies and ballot-counting would raise additional 
procedural and standardization concerns.121 
Questions would also emerge about substantive differences 
in state election conduct. A state that provides an inadequate 
number of polling places or poorly designs its ballots, for 
instance, would have collateral impacts on the total popular 
vote that implicate the interests of other states.122 This conflict 
area could create the need for greater standardization across 
state elections, perhaps requiring a separate and universal 
presidential ballot and polling system.123 
Additionally, a threshold would be needed for a candidate 
to win the election by national popular vote. A majority is an 
intuitive and desirable choice, but it may not be feasible given 
the realities of direct elections. The winner-takes-all system of 
awarding electoral votes virtually ensures the electoral majority 
that the Electoral College requires to avoid a contingent election 
in Congress, but a popular vote majority is much less common: 
no candidate achieved it in seven of the 18 presidential elections 
since World War II, and four of those seven elections have 
118 Anthony J. Gaughan, Ramshackle Federalism: America’s Archaic and 
Dysfunctional Presidential Election System, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 1021, 1038-39 
(2016).
119 See id.
120 See Lawrence Lessig, Ranked-choice voting worked in Maine. Now we should 
use it in presidential races., USA TODAY (Nov. 16, 2018), https://www.
usatoday.com/story/opinion/2018/11/16/ranked-choice-voting-maine-
protest-candidates-election-2018-column/2023574002/.
121 See Gaughan, supra note 118, at 1038-39.
122 See id. at 1041.
123 See id.
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occurred since 1990.124 In most cases, there was no major 
third-party candidate.125 A direct popular vote system would 
make third-party candidates more common because fewer 
candidates would decide not to run out concern they would be 
“spoilers” who would prevent one of the major party candidates 
from winning an electoral vote majority.126
The system could still require a popular vote majority and use a 
runoff election if no candidate secures one outright. It could also 
identify a plurality threshold for victory. The Bayh Amendment 
to abolish the Electoral College set such a threshold at 40 
percent.127 This would reduce the odds that no candidate would 
secure victory, which would be a real possibility if candidates 
were required to win a majority. No president has failed to win 
at least 40 percent of the popular vote since the election of 
1860.128 Still, it would be necessary to include a runoff provision 
if there were a victory threshold, and there would be important 
questions about how it would work, including when a runoff 
would occur, how states would conduct it, who would be eligible 
to vote in it, and whether states where a candidate already 
received a majority would participate.
If a direct popular election were conducted without a runoff, it 
would create the possibility of a candidate receiving a very low 
vote share and winning the presidency in a highly contentious 
multi-candidate race.129 A popular mandate is important to 
effective governance, so some threshold may be cumbersome 
but more desirable.130
2. Advantages
The most important advantage of a direct national popular vote 
is its most well-known feature: it selects a winner with the most 
legitimate claim to a popular mandate. Equalizing the voting 
power of every citizen means the candidate with the most 
popular support wins the election every time.131 This is the only 
electoral system that guarantees such an outcome. Putting the 
vote directly to the people does away with the need to allocate 
electoral votes by geography and population, a process that is 
impossible to design without privileging some voters.
124 United States Presidential Elections, ENCYC. BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.
com/topic/United-States-Presidential-Election-Results-1788863 (last 
visited Apr. 23, 2019).
125 See id.
126 See Akhil Reed Amar, Some Thoughts on the Electoral College: Past, Present, 
and Future, 33 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 467, 474-75 (2007).
127 Florey, supra note 7, at 381.
128 Robb, supra note 2, at 461.
129 See id. at 460.
130 See generally id.
131 See Lienhardt, supra note 66, at 449.
Privilege currently permeates our presidential voting 
system. As discussed in Part II, small-state voters get a 
boost from overrepresentation, and “swing states” attract 
significantly more campaign investment in the winner-takes-
all environment.132 This leaves vast swaths of the American 
electorate undervalued in campaigning and governance 
because candidates do not view many states’ votes as valuable 
or obtainable.133
Even in competitive states, winner-takes-all renders voters 
for a losing candidate unrepresented in the final tabulation, 
effectively disenfranchising them.134 This feature contributes to 
actual and perceived political polarization: blue state Democrats 
and red state Republicans are better represented by candidates, 
leading the public and political system to perceive those states 
as partisan monoliths.135 In an era of increasing partisanship, 
this may be the feature of the Electoral College that most 
diminishes moderate voices and contributes to a sense of 
us-versus-them.136 A national popular vote eliminates these 
distorting effects and fosters a more nuanced understanding of 
the nation’s political geography.
One key question is whether state legislatures would exercise 
greater or lesser control over elections in a national direct vote. 
On the one hand, legislatures would no longer decide how 
their state’s presidential vote is tabulated. On the other, they 
would retain control over voting and could implement measures 
that turn out their party’s voters at the expense of the other.137 
Whereas only swing state legislatures have an incentive to 
manipulate voting in the Electoral College, every state’s votes 
would matter in a direct vote.138 However, that same feature 
might serve to dampen or mitigate an individual legislature’s 
incentives in a national vote: for instance, whereas voting 
measures in Florida today could tip the state’s 29 electoral votes 
(10.7% of the total) to a given candidate, such measures would 
have a narrower impact on the total nationwide popular vote.
132 See supra Part II; Florey, supra note 7, at 352-53.
133 See id.
134 See Florey, supra note 7, at 354. During the 1970s effort in Congress 
to abolish the Electoral College, southern Senator Strom Thurmond 
staunchly opposed eliminating the Electoral College but called for an end 
to the winner-takes-all system. He proposed proportional allocation of 
electoral votes to allow for better representation of voters who supported a 
candidate who lost their state. See S. REP. NO. 96-111, at 71 (1979).
135 Abraham M. Rutchick et al., Seeing Red (and Blue): Effects of Electoral College 
Depictions on Political Group Perception, 9 ANALYSES OF SOC. ISSUES & PUB. POL’Y 
269 (2009). 
136 See id. at 270-71.
137 See Robb, supra note 2, at 459-60 (discussing the related issue of whether 
direct popular election would encourage voter fraud).
138 See id.
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A national direct vote is also very simple, both to administer 
and to explain to the public.139 Beyond being intuitive, it is the 
system that Americans are familiar with for nearly every other 
elected office.140 It also compels greater voter participation, both 
because of its simplicity and because of the re-enfranchising 
impacts mentioned at length above.141 These changes would 
improve public confidence and the legitimacy of elections.
3. Disadvantages
The Electoral College has chosen the president for over 200 
years and has utilized winner-takes-all in every state for roughly 
the same time.142 Switching to national popular vote would 
be a dramatic shift in an otherwise stable process, which 
popular vote critics believe is a deeply undervalued feature of 
the system.143 Election rules should remain as consistent as 
possible to avoid partisan gaming of the system, and the weight 
of precedent arguably makes legislatures more deferential to 
the winner-takes-all system even where changes to it could 
benefit their party.144 One dramatic shift in the system could 
precipitate others that are less politically neutral, which would 
more substantively threaten legitimate American elections than 
the Electoral College’s current defects.145 This is even more the 
case if a switch to the national vote is perceived to favor one 
party over another.146
Even with all of its attendant benefits, any change this sweeping 
would also carry substantial adjustment costs. Parties 
would reformulate their presidential selection strategies and 
candidates would change their campaigning strategies.147 
Federal and state election authorities would need to coordinate 
to a greater degree and develop protocols for the country’s only 
nationwide popular election.148 The public and the media would 
need to re-orient around new conceptions of the electorate and 
139 Florey, supra note 7, at 367.
140 Rhonda D. Hooks, Has the Electoral College Outlived Its’ Stay?, 26 T. MARSHALL 
L. REV. 205 (2001).
141 See Robb, supra note 2, at 459.
142 Herbst, supra note 103, at 228-29.
143 See id.
144 See Michael McLaughlin, Direct Democracy and the Electoral College: Can a 
Popular Initiative Change How a State Appoints its Electors?, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 
2943, 2994 (2008).
145 Bruce Ledewitz, The Five Days in June When Values Died in American Law, 49 
AKRON L. REV. 115, 170-71 (2016).
146 Matthew Sheffield, Poll: Democrats Want to Abolish Electoral College, 
Republicans Want to Keep It, HILL (Mar. 26, 2019), https://thehill.com/hilltv/
what-americas-thinking/435816-poll-republicans-support-electoral-
college-while-democrats-want.
147 Roberta A. Yard, American Democracy and Minority Rule: How the United 
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SANTA CLARA L. REV. 185, 210 (2001).
148 See Gaughan, supra note 118.
strategic voting in the primary and general election.149 Everyone 
in the system would need to adjust to delayed election results, 
as certain states spend days after Election Day certifying a final 
tabulation and litigation threatens final vote counts.150 None of 
these adjustments are necessarily bad, but they highlight that a 
switch will have short-term financial, social, and political costs.
Finally, Electoral College advocates fear that presidential 
candidates will ignore small-state interests when campaigning 
and enacting policy in a direct vote system.151 But this argument 
is unconvincing for two reasons. First, presidential races in the 
modern era are exceedingly close, and votes from both small 
and large constituencies could be sufficient to throw a race to 
one of the candidates.152 Second, campaigns today target their 
efforts based on demographic and psychographic features 
more than geography. In a direct vote system, where voters 
were located would not matter to campaigns.153 Perhaps more 
relevant to these advocates is a potential disadvantage to 
dispersed voters—economizing limited campaign resources 
may require focusing on denser areas, where a single lawn sign 
or volunteer has the potential to activate more support.154 That 
said, cost arguments can still cut both ways. The media market 
adjusts for density differences with price, but administration of 
more media buys in several sparsely populated locales is a fixed 
and unavoidable cost that candidates may want to avoid.155
B. Proportional Allocation
One approach to achieving more parity between electoral and 
popular vote results without abolishing the Electoral College is 
to allocate electors proportionally based on the popular vote in 
each state. Forms of proportional allocation are used all over the 
world to allocate legislative seats within borders.156 What makes 
proportional representation systems attractive is that every 
vote has an impact, irrespective of which candidate or option 
receives the most votes.157 Though such a system would be 
unusual for a single office, the Electoral College is itself a multi-
149 See Yard, supra note 147.
150 Bonnie Berkowitz & Shelly Tan, Think you’ll know who won on election night? 
Not so fast., WASH. POST (Oct. 29, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
graphics/2018/politics/voting-quirks/.
151 See Lienhardt, supra note 66, at 449.
152 See id.
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154 See Calderaro, supra note 102, at 302-05.
155 See Robb, supra note 2, at 457.
156 Lydia Miljan & Geoffrey Alchin, Proportional Representation in Practice: An 
International Comparison of Ballots and Voting Rules, FRASER INST. (2018), 
https://www.fraserinstitute.org/sites/default/files/proportional-
representation-in-practice.pdf.
157 See Yard, supra note 147, at 212.
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member body and could be proportionally allocated in each 
state based on the popular statewide result.
1. Methodology
Proportional allocation could be implemented through a 
constitutional amendment or, much more plausibly, on a state-
by-state basis. But many states may hesitate to implement 
it out of concern that moving away from winner-takes-all 
allocation will reduce their influence in presidential elections. 
Additionally, lawmakers in traditionally red or blue states will 
likely avoid using proportional allocation to ensure that their 
respective parties’ presidential candidates do not lose electoral 
votes they would receive under winner-takes-all allocation. 
Accordingly, implementation of proportional allocation on 
a state-by-state basis would require most states to agree to 
switch to it at the same time. That way, no one state or political 
party would clearly be sacrificing influence or support.
One way to implement proportional allocation would be 
through an integral proportional system, wherein states would 
allocate electors in rough proportion to the statewide popular 
vote.158 Exactly how that allocation would work would depend 
on the number of electors a state has, the number of candidates 
running, and the rules the state sets for allocation.159
For example, a state with three electoral votes could choose to 
round the share of popular vote to the nearest elector so that a 
candidate receiving 53% of the popular vote would be entitled 
to a share of 1.59 electoral votes, rounded to 2. This becomes 
more complicated, however, if no candidate wins a majority—in 
a scenario where two major party candidates receive 48% 
and 46% of the vote, both are entitled to less than 1.5 electoral 
votes, which rounds to 1 each. The state would need a provision 
that allocates that third vote to one of the candidates—either a 
third-party candidate receiving a marginal amount of the vote, 
or (more likely) to the plurality winner.
This would not necessarily just be a problem in small states. In 
2016, Arizona gave all 11 of its electors to Donald Trump after he 
won an exceedingly narrow 48% to 45% victory in the state.160 
Under strict proportional representation, he and Hillary Clinton 
would have each received 5 electors (being entitled to less than 
5.5 electoral votes). However, no single third-party candidate in 
158 See Vincy Fon, Integral Proportional System: Aligning Electoral Votes More 
Closely with State Popular Votes, 16 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 127, 130 (2008).
159 See id.
160 Arizona Results, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 1, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/
elections/2016/results/arizona.
the state achieved the requisite 4.5% required to earn them at 
least one rounded elector vote. As a result, the last vote would 
have been unawarded without another rule to assign it. 
In the 2016 election, 18 states would have had a single 
unawarded elector using a strict integral proportional allocation, 
and one state, Michigan, would have actually over-allocated 
by one elector.161 This specific issue would become more 
problematic if more marginal third-parties enter presidential 
races. Third-party candidates could become more common as 
a consequence of switching to proportional allocation, as they 
would have a more plausible chance of accumulating electoral 
votes.162 Accordingly, integral proportional allocation could not 
be as simple as basic math and rounding.163
One workaround would be to adopt a perfect proportional 
system. Decimals of electors could be awarded to candidates 
in this system so their share of the electoral vote could track 
precisely with the popular vote.164 However, this would create 
its own difficulties. For one thing, such precise adherence to 
popular vote share would put much more weight on the exact 
accuracy of statewide vote totals, which are already frequently 
subject to challenge and litigation in close elections.165 
Moreover, this system would almost certainly require a 
constitutional amendment to abolish the human element of the 
Electoral College and give more flexibility to state legislatures.166
More importantly, however, states would not necessarily want 
to allocate electors purely proportionally even if they adopted 
these systems.167 They might opt to grant one or two extra 
electors to the plurality winner in their state or grant extra 
electors to any candidates who reach a certain threshold.168 
To discourage third-party candidates, states might also set a 
minimum vote percent for a candidate to receive any electors.169 
At any rate, even nationwide adoption of proportional electoral 
allocation would involve some degree of patchwork rules that 
could be manipulated to partisan ends.170
161 See Presidential Election Results: Donald J. Trump Wins, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 9 
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/elections/2016/results/president.
162 David S. Wagner, The Forgotten Avenue of Reform: The Role of States in 
Electoral College Reform and the Use of Ballot Initiatives to Effect That Change, 
25 REV. LITIG. 575, 587 (2006).
163 See also Florey, supra note 7, at 367.
164 Vincy Fon, Electoral College Alternatives and US Presidential Elections, 12 SUP. 
CT. ECON. REV. 41, 45 (2004).
165 See id.
166 See id. at 45.
167 See Fon, supra note 158, at 130.
168 See id.
169 See Florey, supra note 7, at 367.
170 See id.
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2. Advantages
Much like other proposed reforms, proportional allocation 
reduces the likelihood of a split between the popular and 
electoral votes.171 However, it does so without dispensing with 
the Electoral College system.172 Retaining the Electoral College 
would appease groups who fear changing an otherwise stable 
system and those who believe that smaller states should be 
granted an electoral advantage.173 For reform advocates, it 
also may be easier to garner support for an approach that still 
improves conformance between the electoral and the popular 
votes while preserving the Electoral College.174 
Third parties are also likely to benefit from proportional 
representation, where receiving just a small percentage of a 
state’s vote could lead to winning electors.175 A proportional 
system would significantly reduce the “spoiler effect” that 
marginal third parties currently have in presidential races, 
eliminating a major impediment to their candidacies.176 Though 
only a substantial third-party could win the electoral majority 
needed for the presidency, there could be other benefits for 
third-parties to run credible candidates at the top of the ticket. 
It could promote down-ballot third-party candidates and 
a third-party’s public image. Such a change would likely be 
popular too—surveys indicate that a majority of Americans 
believe a third-party is needed,177 and many have argued that 
a bipartisan system is a bad fit for a population as socially and 
geographically diverse as that of the United States.178
Finally, a proportional system would make every vote count. 
Non-plurality candidates would be awarded electors in 
proportion to their popular support, and plurality candidates 
would benefit from a larger margin of victory.179 It could also 
emphasize to Americans that their votes choose electors rather 
than the president, and that states have discretion over how 
those votes are allocated. This is a poorly understood feature 
171 See Lienhardt, supra note 66, at 457.
172 Id.
173 See Fon, supra note 158, at 129.
174 See id. at 130-31.
175 See Florey, supra note 7, at 358-59.
176 See id.
177 R.J. Reinhart, Majority in U.S. Still Say a Third-Party is Needed, GALLUP (Oct. 26, 
2018), https://news.gallup.com/poll/244094/majority-say-third-party-
needed.aspx. 
178 Mark Schmitt, Why America Should Have More Than 2 Political 
Parties, VOX (Sept. 16, 2016, 2:30 PM), https://www.vox.com/
polyarchy/2016/9/16/12934792/more-than-two-parties-good.
179 See Wagner, supra note 162, at 586-87.
of presidential politics.180 Such an educative effect might help 
people understand the system’s advantages and disadvantages 
better and could spur other reform efforts.
3. Disadvantages
Though this method makes it likelier the electoral and popular 
votes will align, it does not guarantee it.181 Small states would 
still have outsize weight, and states would likely modify any 
enacted proportional vote system to grant some electors on a 
non-proportional basis.182 For example, if a proportional vote 
system proposed in Pennsylvania in 2013 had been applied 
nationally in 2016, it would have still awarded more electors 
to Donald Trump than to Hillary Clinton due to its bias toward 
plurality statewide winners.183
Moreover, proportional allocation systems are very susceptible 
to triggering contingent elections where the House of 
Representatives chooses the president and the Senate chooses 
the vice president. As discussed, the Electoral College’s rules 
mandate this procedure when no candidate receives a majority 
of electoral votes. Contingent elections are more likely with 
proportional allocation because it allows third parties to siphon 
away the electoral votes needed for the major party candidates 
to obtain a majority.184 This outcome would be hard to avoid 
in a close contest—a proportional system that does not 
privilege plurality winners would have sent the 2016 election to 
Congress.185 Allowing Congress to select the president would 
move the choice further from the people, effectively eliminating 
one of the primary benefits of proportional allocation.
The higher complexity of proportional systems compared 
to statewide winner-takes-all systems presents another 
disadvantage. The rules for allocating electors mathematically 
need some exceptions, and state legislatures would have wide 
discretion to set those rules.186 This could decrease the public’s 
understanding of the electoral process. A complicated system 
that varies state-by-state would be more confusing to the 
average American. It would also have downstream effects on 
180 Alex Vandermaas-Peeler et al., American Democracy in Crisis: The Challenges 
of Voter Knowledge, Participation, and Polarization, PUB. RELIGION RES. INST. (July 
17, 2018), https://www.prri.org/research/american-democracy-in-crisis-
voters-midterms-trump-election-2018.
181 See Robb, supra note 2, at 451.
182 See id.
183 Gaming the Electoral College, 270TOWIN, https://www.270towin.com/
alternative-electoral-college-allocation-methods (last visited Apr. 23, 
2018).
184 See Lienhardt, supra note 66, at 458. 
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campaigns strategizing to reach thresholds in certain states, 
many outside of the traditional battlegrounds.187 There may 
even be an interplay between campaigns and state legislatures, 
which would have the ability to enact arbitrary rules that favor 
their party’s candidate.188 All of this emphasizes simplicity in the 
process as a virtue, and that moving from winner-take-all to a 
more complex system would carry consequences.
C. Congressional District Method
Two states—Maine and Nebraska—have moved away from 
winner-takes-all allocation in favor of the congressional district 
method.189 Several states adopted this method or something 
similar after the Constitutional Convention, when states were 
more experimental with their elector allocation power.190 The 
congressional district method puts a premium on geography 
and gives a greater political voice to communities over a state 
as a whole. It also disrupts the pernicious impacts of winner-
takes-all in a less mathematically-cumbersome way than 
proportional allocation.
1. Methodology
Like proportional allocation, the congressional district 
method could be implemented either through constitutional 
amendment or by individual states. States and political 
parties may have concerns similar to those they would have 
with proportional allocation—that implementing it absent 
an agreement among many states to do so could result in a 
reduction of influence for a state or support for candidates of 
one of the parties.
Maine and Nebraska use very similar procedures to implement 
the congressional district method. In both states, each 
congressional district tabulates its own presidential vote 
and awards a single electoral vote to their plurality winner.191 
Additionally, a statewide vote is tabulated and the winner 
receives the state’s two remaining electoral votes.192
This method makes it possible for a state to split its electoral 
votes between candidates. In a state with two congressional 
districts and two candidates for president, the districts could 
award their electors to different candidates, resulting in a 3-1 
split of electors in favor of the statewide vote winner. This is 
187 See id. at 588.
188 See Florey, supra note 7, at 367.
189 See Goldfeder, supra note 20, at 968.
190 See Robb, supra note 2, at 449.
191 See Lienhardt, supra note 66, at 453.
192 See id.
what happened in Maine in 2016—Hillary Clinton was the 
statewide winner and won Maine’s 1st District, while Donald 
Trump won the 2nd District. Accordingly, Clinton won three 
electoral votes to Trump’s one.193 Similarly, Barack Obama won 
one congressional district in Nebraska district in 2008 while 
losing the other districts and the statewide vote.194
It is possible in this system for a statewide plurality winner 
to receive less than a plurality of electoral votes.195 This is 
likeliest in states with many electors, where one candidate 
obtains wide plurality margins in a few districts and the other 
candidates obtains narrower plurality margins in the others.196 
Electoral geography and partisan gerrymandering by Republican 
state legislatures have made Democrats susceptible to this 
problem since 2010.197 For this reason, Obama would have 
lost re-election in 2012 despite winning a four-point national 
popular vote majority if every state had used the congressional 
district method.198 He also would have received less electoral 
votes than his Republican opponent in several large states 
despite commanding popular vote majorities in those states, 
which included Florida, Ohio, Michigan, Wisconsin, and 
Pennsylvania.199
Some find this unfair and believe legislatures should adopt 
a rule ensuring that the statewide plurality winner obtains 
a statewide electoral majority or electoral votes equaling 
their plurality share of the vote.200 In such a scenario, Barack 
Obama’s 2012 Electoral College margin would have been 
reduced but still enough to win the presidency. Others believe 
the electoral geography features of congressional district 
method should be enhanced and that a state’s two additional 
electors should be awarded to the candidate who wins the 
greatest number of districts.201 This would give greater control 
of a state’s elector allocation to its legislature when it redistricts.
193 Edward D. Murphy, Trump Takes 1 of Maine’s 4 Electoral Votes, in a First for 
the State, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD (Nov. 8, 2016), https://www.pressherald.
com/2016/11/08/mainers-take-matters-into-their-own-hands-after-
bitter-presidential-campaign/.
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Finally, though the congressional district method typically 
uses congressional districts, states have devised alternative 
methods for creating districts.202 In the Republic’s early years, 
states experimented with special single-member and multi-
member districts exclusively drawn for presidential electors.203 
Some used county and municipal boundaries to create electoral 
districts.204 Maryland took an even more novel approach during 
the first presidential election, holding a statewide election 
but forcing a set number of electors to be chosen from its 
eastern and western sides.205 Each method has its advantages 
and drawbacks, but all demonstrate that it is essential to use 
congressional districts with the district method.
2. Advantages
The congressional district method does much to improve on 
the winner-takes-all system. Though less effective at mitigating 
winner-takes-all than proportional allocation or a national 
direct election, it creates a mechanism for voters to exercise 
electoral power independent from the statewide plurality.206 
Even the antidemocratic features of this method are arguably 
less problematic than those of winner-takes-all—voters who are 
not part of the statewide plurality might still propel their chosen 
candidates to victory in their respective districts.207 
The congressional district method also preserves the Electoral 
College system and one of its key advantages: the lowered 
stakes of the vote count.208 Both proportional allocation and a 
direct national election rely on a single vote count and exact 
vote margins.209 Election litigation and partisan interventions 
into elections could increase quickly if specific vote margins 
are more closely tied to the election’s outcome.210 The 
congressional district method cabins these effects by limiting 
the impact of any single vote to the district in which it is cast, 
making only the most competitive districts subject to scrutiny.211
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Given that districts will be on a spectrum of competitiveness, 
candidates are likely to focus on voters in competitive districts 
at the expense of others. However, the congressional district 
method encourages candidates to focus on a more diverse 
group of voters that cut across state lines.212 This would break 
up the “swing states” in the winner-takes-all system and give 
more constituencies the attention of presidential campaigns.213 
It would also incentivize candidates to focus on swaying 
moderate voters in competitive districts rather than energizing 
their base to win a statewide election.214
Finally, the congressional district method is simple from both an 
administrative and educational standpoint. Voters are familiar 
with congressional districts and would understand how their 
district’s vote impacts the broader election.215 States also have 
already integrated district maps into their election procedure.216 
Counting presidential votes within those boundaries would 
likely require minimal changes to existing processes.
3. Disadvantages
Though it is an improvement over the winner-takes-all system, 
the congressional district method still retains one of its most 
pernicious elements: voters outside the plurality still have 
no representation to pick the president.217 Because districts 
cannot split their electors, plurality power merely shifts from 
the statewide winner to the district winner.218 The congressional 
district method is akin to a winner-takes-all system that 
operates on a district level rather than a state level.219 
Accordingly, candidates can still take advantage of narrow 
majorities in enough places to win the election, albeit through 
a more dispersed and numerous group of voting bodies.220 This 
dynamic is fundamental to why Obama would have lost the 
2012 election under a congressional district method system and 
illustrates why it may be likelier to produce splits between the 
popular and electoral votes in the modern era.
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Pulling congressional districts into the Electoral College would 
also bring all of the attendant concerns about gerrymandering 
and state legislative abuse of redistricting power into 
presidential selection. Legislatures would become much 
more powerful parties in deciding how their states allocate 
presidential electors.221 Voters may question the legitimacy of 
such a process, especially where district lines create substantial 
deviance between the statewide vote and elector allocation. 
Moreover, redistricting would itself become even more political 
as legislators would have enormous incentive to draw maps 
benefitting their parties in both presidential and congressional 
elections.222 These maps would persist for a decade absent 
judicial intervention. The public may demand redrawing of 
the districts out of frustration with perceived corruption and 
disempowerment by state governments.223 This same anger 
could effectively nationalize the politics of state-level elections, 
turning them into a proxy for national politics and distorting 
otherwise independent state governance.224 However, a 
compelling counterargument is that state legislatures may 
have an incentive to create competitive districts to avoid public 
discontent and incentivize candidate attention in their state.225
D. Ranked Choice Voting
Even without reform to the Electoral College or the way votes 
are allocated, states have the power to marginally improve 
their systems’ representativeness through voting reform. First-
past-the-post systems amplify winner-takes-all unfairness by 
awarding a state’s electors to a non-majority plurality winner in 
a multi-candidate election.226 Most alternative voting systems 
correct for this effect by incorporating voters’ next-choice 
preferences or preference strength to identify a candidate with 
majority support.227 Ranked choice voting is one of the more 
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commonly implemented alternative voting systems and could 
substantially improve the fairness of the Electoral College 
system on the state level.
1. Methodology
Some foreign governments, municipal American governments 
and one state have implemented ranked choice or instant 
runoff voting, wherein voters rank candidates for an office 
sequentially according to their preference.228 An initial count of 
first preferences is tabulated after all votes are cast, and if no 
candidate receives a majority, the lowest vote-getter is removed 
and has her votes re-allocated to the other candidates based 
on their voters’ second preferences.229 This process continues 
until a candidate has secured a majority of the votes among the 
remaining candidates.230
In a winner-takes-all system, this would mean that a candidate 
would need an in-state majority to win a state’s electors.231 
For example, if candidates A, B, and C are on the ballot in 
Pennsylvania and they split the popular vote 45-35-20, 
Candidate A would not necessarily receive Pennsylvania’s 
20 electoral votes. The winner would be determined by the 
second-choice preferences of Candidate C’s voters. If enough of 
them supported Candidate B as their next-preferred option, she 
would win Pennsylvania’s electors.
Some assume that ranked choice voting always selects a 
candidate with the majority support of voters. This is not true. 
Because voters are not required to rank every candidate on 
the ballot, tabulation rounds exclude voters whose ranked 
candidates have been eliminated.232 In the above example, 
if the second preferences of candidate C’s voters split 70-10 
between B and A, and 10% selected no second option, the new 
tabulation would result in B receiving 51% of tabulated votes 
and A receiving 49%. However, among all voters, B and A split 
the vote 49-47, with 4% of voters choosing neither candidate.
228 Edward B. Foley, Third-Party and Independent Presidential Candidates: The 
Need for a Runoff Mechanism, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 993, 1020 (2016).
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Methods similar to ranked choice voting like the Condorcet 
method avert this possibility.233 However, they are significantly 
more complex and would present other challenges in both 
enactment and implementation.234 Legislatures would also 
need to consider rules for when voters have equal preferences 
between candidates or when write-in candidacies get 
substantial support.235 Maine is the only state to enact a ranked 
choice system statewide and addresses both issues in its 
election procedures.236
2. Advantages
Third-party and independent candidates benefit from ranked 
choice voting because the spoiler effect is mitigated.237 Some 
scholars argue that spoilers have had a very substantial impact 
on American elections. In a 2016 article advocating for ranked 
choice voting in presidential elections, Edward Foley identifies 
at least six presidential elections where third-party candidates 
changed the major party candidate who won the election.238 
It might be argued that this was the case in the 2016 election, 
where votes for third-party candidates outnumbered the vote 
margin between Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump in several 
key states.239
Ranked choice voting allows third-party candidates to run 
without preventing their preferred major party candidate from 
winning electors—unless, of course, the third-party candidate 
is strong enough to win a statewide majority on their own.240 
This gives a fair shot to more candidates and diversifies the 
viewpoints represented on the national stage.241 This increase 
in third-party activity could also have impacts on voter 
participation and satisfaction, as more voters could support 
a candidate with whom they strongly agree without forfeiting 
their right to decide the presidency.242
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Most importantly, ranked choice voting is an easily 
implemented approach to making it likelier that the winner of a 
statewide election commands a majority of popular support.243 
Many other nations, recognizing the benefit of majority support, 
require candidates for elected office to win a popular majority 
and hold runoff elections between the top two vote-getters 
when no candidate secures a majority in the first round of 
voting.244 A key advantage of ranked choice over runoff systems 
is that it does not limit the field of candidates to the top two 
first-choices through its iterative process.245 It also avoids the 
financial costs of a second election and avoids turnout issues in 
subsequent and more consequential runoffs.246  
3. Disadvantages
While ranked choice voting corrects the anti-majoritarian 
spoiler effect, its key disadvantage is that it leaves alone and 
even enhances other problems in the Electoral College system. 
The risk of a split between the popular and electoral votes is 
still present as long as the winner-takes-all system is in place.247 
Though ranked choice voting would have likely prevented the 
popular-electoral splits in 2000 and 2016, other presidential 
elections may have been thrown to a popular vote loser.248
Additionally, if ranked choice voting caused an emergence of 
third parties, the possibility of contingent elections would be 
increased. A contingent election would occur where a third-
party candidate won enough states to deprive a major party 
candidate of a majority of electoral votes, but not enough states 
to form their own majority.249 Resolving such hotly contested 
elections by a nondemocratic and highly partisan process as 
contingent elections would jeopardize the legitimacy of the 
nation’s election process, as highlighted in Part II.250 However, 
these circumstances might create public momentum for greater 
reform.251 Likewise, a third-party candidate could bargain with 
major party candidates and instruct their electors to vote for 
them instead, avoiding the contingent process.252
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Finally, there are some indications that ranked choice voting 
is not a good fit for the voting public. Critics allege that it is 
more complicated than first-past-the-post, and that it has 
been repealed in some jurisdictions in favor of reverting to 
traditional systems.253 The empirical evidence on both points 
is mixed. Some jurisdictions implementing ranked choice have 
253 See Liam Sigaud, Thanks to Ranked-Choice Voting, Expect a Spike in 
Spoiled Ballots, MAINE WIRE (May 17, 2018), https://www.themainewire.
com/2018/05/ranked-choice-voting-expect-spike-spoiled-ballots/; see 
also Joe Fitzgerald Rodriguez, Amid Heated SF Mayor Contest, Pressure 
Mounts to Repeal Ranked-Choice Voting, S.F. EXAMINER (June 10, 2018), 
https://www.sfexaminer.com/news/amid-heated-sf-mayor-contest-
pressure-mounts-to-repeal-ranked-choice-voting/.
seen ballot invalidation rates about equal to first-past-the-post 
elections, while others have seen much higher rates.254 Likewise, 
more racially or politically diverse candidates being elected 
has often precipitated ranked choice voting repeal, suggesting 
these efforts are motivated more by powerful interests than 
dissatisfaction with the process.255
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IV. Our Recommendation: Nationalize the Vote, Restore 
the College, and Give the People a Meaningful Choice
Proportional allocation and the congressional district method 
both aim to make the better of a difficult situation. They 
preserve the Electoral College framework while bringing it more 
in line with popular democracy by lessening the problems of 
winner-takes-all. Even if one believes the Electoral College 
should not be abolished, proportional allocation and the 
congressional district method are better alternatives than the 
system we have today. Although popular-electoral splits are still 
possible under these systems, they more effectively implement 
the values that many use to argue for the Electoral College, 
namely empowering small states and representing the nation’s 
diverse electoral geography. 
These values are manifested elsewhere in our electoral system 
as well: equal voting power in the Senate was expressly 
designed to protect smaller states and geographic communities 
were meant to be elevated in the House. One could argue 
that making elector apportionment equal to congressional 
representation indicates these values were meant to be 
preserved in presidential selection. We cannot know this for 
sure. What we do know is that the framers did not view electors 
as bound to vote for any candidate.256 They desired electors 
who would deliberate and select a candidate with care, much in 
the way they resolved difficult questions at the Convention.257 
This check between the people and the president was borne out 
of fear that Congress or the public would select a leader who 
was not fit for the presidency.258 This is the paramount value 
embodied by the Electoral College. It is a safeguard designed 
to protect the Republic from itself by handing selection of the 
president, in some sense, to nobility. The framers created a 
body in their own image—appointed by states, comprised of the 
elite—to have a final say on who would be president.
But the Electoral College practically never functioned in this 
manner. The norms around how the nation chooses the 
president have evolved to make it unimaginable that a small 
group of elite citizens would deliberate to choose the president. 
Such a group would be fundamentally anti-democratic. No 
other democracy uses such a body. Accordingly, we propose 
abolishing the Electoral College system as it exists in favor of 
a direct national election winnable by a simple majority. We 
also implore the states to use ranked-choice voting to ensure 
candidates achieve majority support.
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Without a realistic path to a constitutional amendment, 
we endorse the effort to implement direct popular election 
via interstate compact and encourage states to adopt the 
NPVIC. States should also implement ranked-choice voting 
and stipulate that the iterative process will identify a majority 
winner using ballots from states employing it. Though there are 
clear obstacles to its adoption, we believe the NPVIC represents 
the best and most practical effort to improve the way the nation 
chooses the president.
States use the winner-takes-all system because the Electoral 
College incentivizes it. As discussed, an individual state’s 
incentive is to maximize its impact on the total by awarding 
all electors to the winner, and solidly partisan states have an 
incentive to award as many of their electors as possible to their 
statewide winner.259 These effects are enhanced for every other 
state that chooses to use winner-takes-all.260 In that way, an 
unspoken sort of compact already exists between the states, 
with deviance punished by devaluation in presidential selection 
and costs for a state’s presidential preference.261
Accordingly, all the states must act in concert to amend it. 
Absent a constitutional amendment, there is no practical path 
to meaningful Electoral College reform on a state-by-state basis 
aside from a compact.
We recognize that the NPVIC has attracted solely partisan 
support and that support by only one of the political parties will 
likely be insufficient to gain implementation in states holding a 
majority of the electoral votes. However, we do not accept the 
premise that electoral reform is necessarily a partisan issue. That 
Democratic presidential candidates lost the two most recent 
races where there was a split between the popular and electoral 
votes does not mean that a Republican candidate could not lose 
a future election in the same manner. This would shift the politics 
of reform dramatically. If more states continue to sign onto the 
NPVIC and it gets closer to an electoral majority necessary, 
conversation about electoral reform will follow and force reluctant 
politicians on both sides of the aisle to defend the deeply 
unpopular proposition of keeping the Electoral College unchanged.
There are valid questions regarding the compact’s 
constitutionality. The Constitution’s Interstate Compact Clause 
may require that NPVIC receive congressional approval.262 
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It is important for members of the public to understand this 
issue and lobby Congress to approve the compact. Similarly, 
members of the public in states that have not approved the 
compact should lobby their representatives to support it. Even 
if the NPVIC is not adopted by enough states or is struck down 
on constitutional grounds, we believe public momentum should 
be brought to bear on Electoral College reform, and that more 
avenues for reform will open up if this one is pursued to its 
endpoint.
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Conclusion
The NPVIC represents the most promising and meaningful 
reform effort in a generation. We urge those invested in 
Electoral College reform to commit to supporting it and 
continue the important work of truly democratizing American 
presidential elections.
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